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in	Ukraine	has	 reached	a	 record-low	 level	of	 around	2.5	million	 tonnes	
annually.	
•	The	current	situation	 in	 the	Ukrainian	oil	 sector	 is	a	consequence	of	 the	
lack	of	 state	 supervision.	The	government	has	 failed	 to	develop	an	effec-
tive	 strategy	 for	developing	 this	 section	of	 the	 economy	and	 for	 combat-
ing	the	systemic	corruption	among	the	Ukrainian	ruling	class.	This	led	to	
the	privatisation	concept	adopted	in	the	late	1990s	failing	and	the	sale	of	
key	 refineries	 to	 Russian	 companies.	 Furthermore,	 subsequent	 Ukrain-
ian	governments	accepted	the	situation	in	which	the	key	state-owned	oil	

































sumption	was	under	 10%	a	decade	ago,	 its	present	 level	 is	85%.	Ukraine	
thus	relies	heavily	on	fuel	supplies	from	other	countries,	mainly	Belarus,	
Russia	and	Lithuania.	Belarusian	fuels	have	gained	an	especially	strong	
























•		Ukrainian	 refineries	 are	unlikely	 to	be	modernised	 in	 the	 coming	years	
given	the	huge	costs	of	the	investments	required,	since	most	of	the	instal-
lations	would	practically	need	to	be	built	from	scratch.	Furthermore,	some	
refineries	are	subject	 to	ownership	dispute	 (Odessa),	while	others	 (Lysy-
























































I. Fuel consumptIon on the ukraInIan market
The	oil	sector	in	Ukraine	is	less	significant	than	the	gas,	coal	and	nuclear	sec-
tors	which	form	the	core	of	the	Ukrainian	energy	sector.	This	is	because	pe-






Chart 1. Ukraine’s energy balance in 2015 
natural gas – 36.6%




hydro energy – 0.8%
solar/wind energy – 0.4%




reaching	 8.1	million	 tonnes	 in	 2016.	While	 diesel	 oil	 consumption	 remained	
at	a	 level	of	 around	5.5–6	million	 tonnes,	petrol	 consumption	 level	 fell	 from	
5.3	million	tonnes	in	2008	to	2.2	million	in	2016.	As	shown	in	the	chart	below,	
































Chart 2. Petrol, diesel oil and LPG consumption in Ukraine (million tonnes)











Data: State Statistics Service of Ukraine 
A	fall	that	large	was	brought	about	by	a	number	of	factors,	the	most	important	
of	which	are:
 – the economic crisis which has significantly undermined economic activity;
 – the loss of crimea and the outbreak of war in the Donbas which used to 
have a 10% share in total fuel consumption in Ukraine;
 – the fact that car owners are shifting from petrol to lpG – LPG con-





























































































 Chart 3. Oil processing at Ukrainian refineries (million tonnes)




















































































































































































































































































quantities	 of	 imported	 oil	 (mainly	 from	Azerbaijan	 and	Kazakhstan).	 Small	









Chart 4. Crude oil imports to Ukraine (million tonnes)






























































for	 the	 development	 of	 the	 sector;	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 corruption,	 including	

















neprovsky	Main	Oil	 Pipeline	 connecting	Odessa	 and	Kremenchuk	 from	which	
Urals	oil	was	pumped	out	in	2016	and	replaced	with	Azeri	Light	oil.
Privat	Group	is	not	currently	planning	to	launch	a	comprehensive	programme	
























































enko	had	 to	flee	 the	Ukrainian	prosecution	 authorities	 due	 to	 charges	 of	
large-scale	corruption.	The	company’s	present	ownership	status	is	unclear.	




































availability	 of	 crude	 oil	 is	 a	 problem,	 and	 (in	 addition	 to	Ukrainian	 oil)	 the	
company	processes	small	quantities	of	oil	from	Kazakhstan.	
In	2016,	Ukrainian	oil	companies	produced	approximately	1.45	million	tonnes	




Ukrainian	experts,	 if	modernisation	 is	 continued	and	crude	oil	 supplies	are	
ensured,	the	output	of	these	fuels	could	increase	to	6	million	tonnes	annually,	
above	all	owing	to	the	existing	capacity	of	the	Kremenchuk	refinery13.	
the future of the oil sector according to the Draft energy strategy 
of ukraine to 2035 
The Draft Energy Strategy of Ukraine to 2035 has been developed by the 
Ministry of Energy and Coal Mining in co-operation with the National In-
stitute of Strategic Studies and the private Ukrainian Centre for Economic 
and Political Studies named after Olexandr Razumkov14. The document 
was published on 19 December 2016 for further consultation. 
Relatively little space in the document is devoted to the oil sector. The 
strategy points out its main weaknesses, such as: the low technical level of 
Ukrainian refineries; the difficult financial situation; the lack of a strategic 
approach from the state; the ineffective regulatory, fiscal and tariff policy; 
the non-transparency of the fuel market; the absence of stimuli for mod-































of a serious collapse. The document also criticises the approach of the pre-
vious governments who were too hasty in concluding that investors would 
guarantee sufficient quantities of crude oil to be processed at Ukrainian 
refineries. The strategy also concludes that for more than twenty years the 
state has failed to adopt a single document of a strategic nature that would 
set the sector’s development goals. The most recent one was the develop-
ment programme for the refining industry adopted in 1993. This, though, 
has not been implemented. 
The strategy formulates the following main goals for the development of 
the refining sector: 















The strategy envisages achieving these goals in three stages: 
1.	 in 2017–2020, adopting	the	governmental	programme	for	the	moderni-
sation	of	 the	 refining	 industry,	 a	 gradual	 improvement	 of	 the	quality	
























including	 creating	 conditions	 for	 the	 influx	 of	 foreign	 oil	 extracting	
firms	and	for	building	a	modern	refinery	in	Ukraine”;	
2.	 in 2021–2025,	 creating	 conditions	 to	 ensure	 oil	 supplies	 via	pipelines	






part	 of	 international	 extraction	 projects,	 ensuring	 that	 the	 share	 of	
crude	oil	supplied	from	a	single	direction	does	not	exceed	30%.
The main problem of the strategy to 2035 is the vague character of most 
of its provisions, including the one concerning declared state support, 
and the lack of a mechanism that would lead to the modernisation of the 
Ukrainian refining sector. As a result, it is difficult to recognise this docu-
ment as a real ‘signpost’ for the refining industry’s reform. It is rather a set 
of proposals without a clearly determined way as to how they could be put 
into practice. The strategy has also been criticised by numerous Ukrainian 
experts and by the European Commission which stated that it was overly 

























IV. oIl extractIon In ukraIne
Ukraine’s	 estimated	 oil	 reserves	 range	 between	 63	million	 tonnes	 (experts’	
estimates)	 and	 137	million	 tonnes	 (Naftogaz’s	 estimates)16.	 Until	 recently,	
Ukraine’s	own	oil	output	was	around	4.5	million	tonnes	annually	and	was	pro-
cessed	by	Ukrainian	 refineries.	The	 fuels	made	 from	 it	 satisfied	around	one	
fifth	of	domestic	demand.	However,	over	the	past	few	years,	oil	extraction	has	
been	falling	rapidly	as	a	result	of	the	depletion	of	the	oil	fields	in	use	and	an	
insufficient	 level	 of	 investments.	The	 level	 of	 oil	production	was	 reduced	by	
45%	between	2009	and	2016	and	forecasts	indicate	that	it	will	continue	to	fall.	





























































































































2. the situation of ukrGasVydobuvannya
UkrGasVydobuvannya	has	also	been	a	political	piggy	bank	for	subsequent	gov-
ernment	elites	over	the	past	 few	years.	After	2010,	 the	management	of	Ukr-
GasVydobuvannya	 (which	 is	 one	 of	Ukraine’s	 largest	 and	 richest	 companies	
producing	around	15	billion	m3	of	natural	gas	annually)	was	entrusted	to	oli-
garch	Dmytro	Firtash.	According	to	 information	from	the	Ukrainian	media,	
he	won	an	informal	 ‘tender’	by	paying	one	billion	dollars	to	 the	 inner	circle	
of	President	Yanukovych20.	A	gas	market	reform	was	 initiated	following	the	














































































Chart 6. Petrol and diesel oil production in Ukraine compared to imports of 
these fuels (%)





















































































































1.1. Fuel supplies from Belarus










































Chart 9. Fuel supplies from Belarus to Ukraine (million tonnes)









































Chart 10. The share of fuels imported from Belarus in the Ukrainian market (%)











crude	 oil	 supplies	 to	 Belarusian	 refineries	 from	 non-Russian	 sources.	 The	
Odessa–Brody	oil	 pipeline	 and	 then	 the	 southern	 section	of	 the	Druzhba	oil	
pipeline	may	become	an	alternative	route	of	crude	oil	supplies	to	Belarus.	
1.2. Fuel supplies from Russia




of	Viktor	Yanukovych’s	presidency,	 this	 increase	resulted	from	the	fact	 that	
part	of	the	market	had	been	taken	over	by	‘the	family’,	i.e.	his	inner	business	
circle,	 in	 particular	 Serhiy	 Kurchenko’s	 firms	 (for	 example,	 VETEK)	which	
imported	diesel	oil	from	Russia.	In	2015,	Russian	companies	sold	1.75	million	
tonnes	of	petroleum	products	in	Ukraine,	including	1.2	million	tonnes	of	diesel	







































the product oil pipeline from russia
After the collapse of the USSR, the ownership of the product oil pipelines 
running from Ukraine was transferred not to Ukraine (unlike with the 
Ukrainian section of the Druzhba oil pipeline) but to Transneft, the Russian 
state-owned monopoly. The most important asset was the Samara–West Di-
rection product oil pipeline, with an annual transport capacity of 3.5 mil-
lion tonnes and a length of 1,433 km, connecting the Russian-Ukrainian 
border with the Ukrainian-Hungarian border, which is managed by a com-
pany named PrykarpatZapadTrans. However, in 2011, a Ukrainian court 
transferred the ownership of this pipeline to the Ukrainian Treasury, and 
this was confirmed by a decision passed by the Ukrainian Supreme Eco-
nomic Court in March 2015. Unexpectedly, the decision was cancelled by 
a court in Rivne, at the same time transferring the ownership of the prod-
uct oil pipeline to the Russian company. In August 2015, Transneft sold the 
pipeline to Switzerland’s International Trading Partners AG, and in De-
cember 2015 the Ukrainian Anti-Trust Committee approved this deal and it 
was finally signed in March 2016. 
It is unclear why, during a Russian-Ukrainian war, the government in Kyiv 
in fact allowed Russia to take over control of the strategic transport infra-
structure and then to sell it to a money mule from Switzerland. Further-
more, according to information from the Ukrainian press, International 
Trading Partners AG is most likely controlled by Viktor Medvedchuk, 
a Ukrainian politician who is reputed to be an important lobbyist of Rus-
sian interests in Ukraine. 
Russia	is	also	a	major	LPG	supplier	to	the	Ukrainian	market.	In	2016,	supplies	
reached	 almost	 0.8	million	 tonnes,	which	 ensured	 a	 54%	 share	 in	 the	 sales	




















































































Chart 11. The share (%) of supplies from Poland and Lithuania in imports of 
petrol and diesel oil 








Lithuania (petrol) Lithuania (diesel)Poland (petrol) Poland (diesel)
Data: Consulting Group A-95 
1.4. Other foreign suppliers









2. the costs of fuel imports
The	 regularly	 growing	 share	 of	 foreign	 fuels	 in	 Ukrainian	 consumption	
has	 caused	 foreign	 petroleum	 products	 to	 have	 a	 very	 important	 position	



























Chart 12. The value of fuel imports to Ukraine (US$ billion)












Chart 13. Import of fuels to Ukraine as a % of total imports





























VI. the Grey Fuel economy
It	is	impossible	to	understand	the	situation	in	the	Ukrainian	oil	sector	with-
out	taking	into	account	the	significance	of	the	schemes	of	illegal	fuel	imports	





























































































































































1. The premium class networks (including WOG, Okko, Shell, Amic and 
Socar) have the greatest market share. In aggregate, they have around 
1,100 filling stations but they control as much as 45% of the market share. 
The fuel they sell is the most expensive but its class is the highest and it 
originates from legal sources. These networks are usually honest taxpayers. 
2. The second group, known as ‘privat Group’ (Avias, Ukrnafta, ANO, Sentoza 
and, Maveks networks) because it is owned by Ihor Kolomoyskyi and his 
business partner Henadiy Boholyubov or the companies de facto controlled 
by them (the state-owned Ukrnafta). Its market share is around 30%, and it 
sells fuel via around 1,500 filling stations. The fuel they sell is the cheapest 
on the market, but its quality varies. 
3. The third group includes the remaining retailers who have the largest 
number of stations (around 3,600) but at the same time their market share is 
only 25%. The fuel sold by these networks is usually cheap but of low quality 
and often originating from the grey economy.





































































side	 is	 114	million	 tonnes	 and	 on	 exit	 56	million	 tonnes	 (borders	 with	 EU	
member	states).	
Three	transit	oil	mains	run	through	Ukraine:









•	Odessa–Brody,	 connecting	 the	 Pivdennyi	 terminal	 near	 Odessa	 (with	
a	transport	capacity	of	14.5	million	tonnes,	adjusted	to	receive	tankers	car-




































Chart 15. Oil transit via Ukrainian territory (million tonnes)








Data: Ukrtransnafta, Ministry of Energy and Coal Mining














ment’s	 concession,	was	 informally	 entrusted	 to	Privat	Group.	This	 company	


































the	Michurinsk–Kremenchuk	 pipeline	 and	 probably	 also	 the	 Odessa–Brody	
pipeline.	According	to	this	corruption	scheme,	the	oil	from	the	pipeline	used	
































Ix. conclusIon: the state stIll has 
no strateGy
The	formally	applicable	oil	strategy	of	Ukraine	to	2030,	approved	in	July	2013,	
envisaged	 that	 fuel	 consumption	 in	Ukraine	would	 grow	 to	 11.2–11.7	million	
tonnes	 in	 2015	(in	 fact,	 it	 reached	 7.4	million	 tonnes),	 and	 oil	 processing	 at	
Ukrainian	refineries	would	then	reach	11–13.5	million	tonnes	(in	 fact,	 it	was	
2.5	million	tonnes).	The	document	diagnosed	that	the	Ukrainian	oil	sector	was	




























































Everything	 suggests	 that	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	Ukrainian	 oil	market	will	 con-
tinue.	Since	 the	Maidan	revolution,	 the	 state	has	not	adopted	any	new	poli-
cy	towards	this	sector	of	the	economy.	It	was	only	in	December	2016	that	the	
Ministry	of	Energy	and	Coal	Mining	presented	the	Draft	Energy	Strategy	of	
Ukraine	to	2035.	However,	this	document	is	too	vague	and	overly	optimistic	
at	many	points,	which	means	that	the	state	is	still	a	long	way	from	adopting	
a	final	document	that	might	bring	about	a	change	in	its	policy.	While	positive	
and	unprecedented	reforms	have	been	implemented	in	the	Ukrainian	gas	sec-
tor,	the	crisis	situation	in	the	oil	industry	is	ongoing.	Considering	the	trends	
outlined	in	this	report,	the	existing	condition	is	likely	to	be	maintained	in	the	
coming	years.	
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